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Abstract
We study the robust Nash equilibrium (RNE) for a class of games in communications systems and
networks where the impact of users on each other is an additive function of their strategies. Each user
measures this impact, which may be corrupted by uncertainty in feedback delays, estimation errors,
movements of users, etc. To study the outcome of the game in which such uncertainties are encountered,
we utilize the worst-case robust optimization theory. The existence and uniqueness conditions of RNE
are derived using finite-dimensions variational inequalities. To describe the effect of uncertainty on the
performance of the system, we use two criteria measured at the RNE and at the equilibrium of the game
without uncertainty. The first is the difference between the respective social utility of users and, the
second is the differences between the strategies of users at their respective equilibria. These differences
are obtained for the case of a unique NE and multiple NEs. To reach the RNE, we propose a distributed
algorithm based on the proximal response map and derive the conditions for its convergence. Simulations
of the power control game in interference channels, and Jackson networks validate our analysis.
Index Terms
Resource allocation, robust game theory, variational inequality, worst-case robust optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed designs for multi-user communications networks and systems have been extensively used
during the past decade to implement low-cost, scalable, and limited-message-passing networks. In doing
so, transmitter and receiver pairs with local information determine their transmission strategies in an
autonomous manner. To deploy such designs, it is essential to know whether they converge to a (preferably
unique) equilibrium, and evaluate their performances at the emerging equilibrium/equilibria.
Strategic non-cooperative game theory provides an appropriate framework for analyzing and designing
such environments where users (i.e., transmitter-receiver pairs) are rational and self-interested players
that aim to maximize their own utilities by choosing their transmission strategies. The notion of Nash
equilibrium (NE), at which no user can attain a higher utility by unilaterally changing its strategy, is
frequently used to analyze the equilibrium point of non-cooperative games. To derive the conditions for
2NE’s existence and uniqueness, different approaches such as fixed point theory, contraction mapping and
variational inequalities (VI) [1]–[3] have been widely applied in both wired and wireless communication
networks, including applications to flow and congestion control, network routing, and power control in
interference channels [4]–[11].
However, there are numerous sources of uncertainty in measured parameter values of communication
systems and networks such as joining or leaving new users, delays in the feedback channel, estimation
errors and channel variations. Therefore, obtaining accurate values of users’ interactions may not be
practical, and considering uncertainty and proposing a robust approach are essential in designing reliable
communications systems and networks.
To make a NE robust against uncertainties, two distinct approaches have been proposed in the literature:
the Bayesian approach where the statistics of uncertain parameters are considered and the utility of each
user is probabilistically guaranteed, and the worst-case approach where a deterministic closed region,
called the uncertainty region, is considered for the distance between the exact and the estimated values
of uncertain parameters, and the utility of each user is guaranteed for any realization of uncertainty within
the uncertainty region [12]–[15].
Both of these approaches have been applied to the power allocation problem in spectrum sharing
environments and cognitive radio networks [13], [14], [16], [17] to study the conditions for NE’s existence
and uniqueness, where the uncertain parameters are interference levels and channel gains. However, to
incorporate robustness in communications systems and networks, there exist multiple challenges such as:
1) How to implement robustness in a wider class of problems in communication systems? 2) How to
derive the conditions for existence and uniqueness of the robust NE (RNE)? 3) What is the impact of
considering uncertainties on the system’s performance at its equilibrium compared to that of the case
with no uncertainty? 4) How to design a distributed algorithm for reaching the robust equilibrium?
In this paper, we aim to answer the above questions using the worst-case robust optimization. In
doing so, we consider a general class of games where the impact of users on each other is an additive
function of their actions, which causes couplings between users. We refer to this class of game as the
additively coupled games (ACGs). In the ACG, we consider that the users’ observations of such impacts
are uncertain due to variations in system parameters and changes in other users’ strategies. Via the worst-
case approach, we assume that uncertain observations by each user are bounded in the uncertainty region,
and each user aims to maximize its utility for the worst-case condition of error. We refer to an ACG that
considers uncertainty as a robust ACG (RACG), and an ACG that does not consider uncertainty as the
nominal ACG (NACG). To study the conditions for existence and uniqueness of the RNE, we apply VI
3[2], and show that with bounded and convex uncertainty, the RNE always exists. We also show that the
RNE is a perturbed solution of VI, and derive the condition for RNE’s uniqueness based on the condition
for NE’s uniqueness.
Furthermore, we compare the performance of the system at the RNE with that at the NE in terms of
two measures: 1) the difference between the users’ strategies at the RNE and the NE, 2) the difference
between the social utility at the RNE and at the NE. When the RNE is unique, we derive the upper bound
for the difference between social utilities at the RNE and at the NE, and show that the social utility at the
RNE is always less than that at the NE. However, obtaining these two measures is not straightforward
when the NE is not unique. In this case, we demonstrate a condition in which the social utility at a RNE
is higher than that at the corresponding NE. Finally, we apply the proximal response map to propose a
distributed algorithm for reaching the RNE, and derive the conditions for its convergence.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we summarize the system model of
the NACG. In Section III, we introduce the RACG and its RNE. Section IV covers the existence and
uniqueness conditions if the RNE. In Section V, we show that when the utility function is logarithmic,
the RNE can be obtained via affine VI (AVI), and its uniqueness condition is simplified. In Section VI,
we propose distributed algorithm for reaching RNE. In Section VII, we discuss the effects of robustness
for the case of multiple Nash equilibria, followed by Section VIII, where we provide simulation results
to illustrate our analytical developments for the power allocation problem and for the Jackson networks.
Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section IX.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a set of communication resources divided into K orthogonal dimensions, e.g., frequency
bands, time slots, and routes, which are shared between a set of users denoted by N = {1, · · · , N}, where
each user consists of a transmitter and a receiver. We assume that users do not cooperate with each other,
and formulate the resource allocation problem as a strategic non-cooperative game G = {N , (vn)n∈N ,A},
where N is the set of players (users) in the game, A =∏n∈N An is the joint strategy space of the game,
and An ⊆ RK is the strategy space of user n in which the strategy of each user is limited in each
dimension. The sum of strategies of each user over all dimensions is bounded, i.e.,
An = {an = (a
1
n, · · · , a
K
n )|a
k
n ∈ [a
min
n,k , a
max
n,k ] and
K∑
k=1
akn ≤ a
max
n } (1)
where aminn,k and amaxn,k is the minimum and the maximum transmission strategy of each user in each
dimension and amaxn is the bound on the sum of strategies of user n over all dimensions, e.g., the maximum
4transmit power of each user. The function vn(a) : A → R is the utility function of user n and depends
on the chosen strategy vector of all users a = [a1, · · · , aN ], where an ∈ An is the action of user n. The
vector of actions of all users except user n is denoted by a−n ∈ A−n where A−n =
∏
m∈N ,m6=nAm is
the strategy space of all users except user n.
In a non-cooperative strategic game, each user aims to maximize its own utility subject to its strategy
space as
max
an∈An
vn(a), ∀n ∈ N . (2)
which is the optimization problem of each user in the game. Let us assume that the utility of each user
is a function of its action and the impact of the others users’ actions over all dimensions, i.e.,
vn(an, fn(a−n, xn)) =
K∑
k=1
vkn(a
k
n, f
k
n(a−n, xn)) (3)
where fn(a−n, xn) = [f1n(a−n, xn), ..., fKn (a−n, xn)] is the 1 ×K vector of the additive impact of other
users on user n with the following elements
fkn(a−n, xn) =
∑
m∈N ,m6=n
akmx
k
nm + y
k
n, ∀k, (4)
where xn = [xn1, · · · , xn(n−1), xn(n+1), · · · , xnN , yn] is the vector of system’s parameters for user n, in
which xnm = [x1nm, · · · , xKnm], and xknm represents the system’s parameters between user n and user m
in dimension k, e.g., the channel gain between user n and user m in sub-channel k; yn = [y1n, · · · , yKn ] is
the vector of the effect of system on user n, e.g., noise in sub-channels for user n, and ykn is related to the
kth dimension. Assuming fkn(a−n, xn) as a linear function is very practical in communication networks.
For example, the interference in each receiver is a linear and additive function of the actions of other
users and channel gains plus noise. We also assume that A1) The utility function of each user is an
increasing, twice differentiable, and concave function with respect to an and has bounded gradients; A2)
The utility function of each user is a decreasing, twice differentiable, and convex function with respect
to fn(a−n, xn); A3) The utility function of each user is twice differentiable over an, and fn(a−n, xn).
Note that A1 is a typical utility function in communications networks [18]; A2 is a practical assumption
for sharing resources between non-cooperative users [7]; and A3 indicates that the utility function is
continuously differentiable with respect to an and fn(a−n, xn). As such, the above assumptions A1-A3
are typical in communications systems and networks.
Interactions between users are studied at the NE, which corresponds to the strategy profile a∗ =
(a∗1, · · · , a
∗
N ) such that for any other strategy profile, we have [1]
vn(a
∗
n, fn(a∗−n, xn)) ≥ vn(an, fn(a∗−n, xn)), n ∈ N . (5)
5In what follows, we denote the achieved utility of user n at the NE by v∗n and the social utility at the NE
by v∗ =
∑N
n=1 v
∗
n, derive the conditions for NE’s existence and uniqueness conditions via reformulating
NE through VI, and show that in this way, the NE and the RNE can be analyzed similarly.
Remark 1. Consider F(a) = (Fn(a))Nn=1, where
Fn(a) = (−∇anvn(an, fn(a−n, xn)), (6)
where ∇anvn(an, fn(a−n, xn)) denotes the column gradient vector of vn(an, fn(a−n, xn)) with respect to
an. The NE of G can be obtained by solving V I(A,F) (Proposition 1.4.2 in [2]) as
(a− a∗)F(a∗) ≥ 0,∀a ∈ A, (7)
Since vn(an, fn(a−n, xn)) is a continuous and concave function with respect to an ∈ An, F(a) is a
continuous map. From (1), the set A is convex and compact. Therefore, the solution set of V I(A,F) is
nonempty and compact (Theorem 2.2.1 in [2]). Consequently, the NE of ACG exists.
Remark 2. Let us consider the following definitions of mapping F(a),
αn(a) , smallest eigenvalue of−∇2anvn(an, fn(a−n, xn)) =⇒ α
min
n , inf
a∈A
αn(a), ∀n ∈ N (8)
βnm(a) , ‖ − ∇anamvn(an, fn(a−n, xn))‖, ∀n 6= m =⇒ βmaxnm , sup
a∈A
βn(a), ∀n ∈ N (9)
where ∇2anvn(an, fn(a−n, xn)) and ∇anamvn(an, fn(a−n, xn)) are the K×K Jacobian matrices of Fn(a)
with respect to an and am, respectively. Now, consider the N ×N matrix Υ whose elements are
[Υ]nm =

 α
min
n if m = n
−βmaxnm if m 6= n.
When Υ is a P -matrix, the mapping F(a) is strictly monotone and the NE is unique (Theorem 12.5 in
[3]).
This setup is applicable to some important problems in communications systems and networks, such
as the additively coupled sum constrained game [7], which can be used to formulate, e.g., power control
in interference channels, and the Jackson network. These two systems are chosen to illustrate the validity
of our approach and analysis. Table I contains the parameters of the power control, and the Jackson
network games.
The power control in interference channels can be formulated by a ACG, where each player, consisting
of a transmitter and receiver pair, competes with other players to maximize its total data rate over K
distinct sub-channels. The strategy of each user is its transmit power in K sub-channels, where hknn is
the direct channel gain between the transmitter and receiver pair n, and h¯knm =
hknm
hknn
and σ¯kn =
σkn
hknn
are
6the normalized interference channel gain between transmitter m and receiver n, and the normalized noise
power in sub-channel k, respectively. For the Jackson network in Table I, arriving packets to node n are
split into K = [1, · · · ,K] traffic classes, and the input rate and service rate for class k are ψkn and µkn,
respectively. Here, ψkn is the strategy of player n in dimension k. The total rate is subject to the minimum
rate constraint, i.e.,
∑K
k=1 ψ
k
n ≥ ψ
min
n . A packet of class k completing service at node m is routed to
node n with probability rknm, or exit the network with probability rkm0 = 1−
∑N
n=1 r
k
nm. In this scenario,
we denote [Rk]nm = rknm, Θk = (1−Rk)−1, and νknm = [Θk]nm. It can be shown that the user’s utility
for minimizing M/M/1 queueing delay can be expressed by dn(Ψ) =
∑K
k=1
1
µkn−
∑
N
m=1
νknmψ
k
m
, where
Ψ = [Ψ1, · · · ,ΨN ], and Ψn = [ψ1n, · · · , ψKn ] ∀n ∈ N . The optimization problem can be rewritten by
maximizing
∑K
k=1 µ
k
n −
∑N
m=1 ν
k
nmψ
k
m subject to the minimum data rate constraint for each user.
III. ROBUST GAMES
As stated earlier, users may encounter different sources of uncertainty caused by variations in a−n
and/or xnm, which cause variations in the utility function of each user, and prevent users from attaining
their expected performance. To deal with such issues, we assume that all uncertainties for a given user
can be modeled by variations in the user’s observation fn(a−n, xn), i.e.,
f˜n(a−n, xn) = fn(a−n, xn) + f̂n(a−n, xn), (10)
where f˜n(a−n, xn) = [f˜1n(a−n, xn), · · · , f˜Kn (a−n, xn)], fn(a−n, xn) = [f1n(a−n, xn), · · · , fKn (a−n, xn)],
and f̂n(a−n, xn) = [f̂1n(a−n, xn), · · · , f̂Kn (a−n, xn)] are the actual observation, the nominal observation,
and the error in observation of user n, respectively. In the worst-case robust optimization theory, uncer-
tainties are assumed to be bounded to the uncertainty region, stated by
ℜn(a−n) = {˜fn(a−n, xn) ∈ ℜn(a−n)| ‖̂fn(a−n, xn)‖p ≤ εn} ,∀n ∈ N (11)
where ‖ t ‖p= p
√
(
∑N
i=1 t
p
i ) denotes the linear norm with order p > 1. In communication and network
systems, the ellipsoid region, i.e., p = 2, has been commonly used to model uncertainty [15], [19], [20].
We also use the norm with p = 2 in our robust game, and denote the uncertainty region by ℜn(a−n) so
as to indicate that it is an additive function of the actions of other users and system parameters, i.e., it
is not a fix region.
The effect of uncertainty in f˜n(a−n, xn) is highlighted by a new variable in the utility function of each
user as
un(an, f˜n(a−n, xn)) =
K∑
k=1
ukn(a
k
n, f˜
k
n(a−n, xn)), ∀n ∈ N (12)
7in such a way that
vn(an, fn(a−n, xn)) = un(an, f˜n(a−n, xn))|εn=0, ∀n ∈ N (13)
The objective of the worst-case approach is to find the optimal strategy for each user that optimizes
its utility under the worst condition of error in the uncertainty region. In this approach, from A2, the
optimization problem of each user can be formulated as [21]
u˜n = max
an∈An
min
f˜n(a−n,xn)∈ℜn(a−n)
un(an, f˜n(a−n, xn)), (14)
where u˜n is the achieved utility of user n in the worst-case approach. The domain of optimization problem
(14) is defined by
Ân(a−n) = An ×ℜn(a−n) (15)
which is a function of other users’ strategy. We represent the RACG by G˜ = {N , (un)n∈N , Â} where
Â =
∏N
n=1 Ân(a−n). The solution to (12) for user n is a pair (a˜′n, f′n(a−n, xn)) ∈ An × ℜn(a−n) that
satisfies [13]
max
an∈An
un(an, f′n(a−n, xn)) = un(a˜
′
n, f′n(a−n, xn)) = minfn(a−n,xn)∈ℜn(a−n)
un(a˜
′
n, fn) (16)
which is the saddle point of (12). Using the above, the equilibrium of the robust game G is defined below.
Definition 2. The RNE of RACG corresponds to the strategy profile a˜∗ = (a˜∗1, · · · , a˜
∗
N ) if and only if
for any other strategy profile a˜n we have [21]
min
f˜n(a−n,xn)∈ℜn
un(a˜
∗
n, f˜n(a∗−n, xn)) ≥ min
f˜n(a−n,xn)∈ℜn
un(a˜n, f˜n(a∗−n, xn)) ∀ a˜n ∈ An(a−n) (17)
We denote the achieved utility of user n at the RNE by u˜∗n and the social utility at the RNE by u˜∗ =∑N
n=1 u˜
∗
n.
IV. RNE ANALYSIS: EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS CONDITIONS
Now we derive the characteristics of the RNE in the RACG from the NE in the NACG. For convenience,
in what follows, we omit the arguments a−n and xn in f˜n(a−n, xn).
A. Existence of the RNE
To analyze the existence of RNE, we encounter two problems. First, by considering uncertainty in the
utility of each user, the utility may become non-convex, and analyzing RNE may become impossible.
Second, the strategy space of user n changes to Ân(a−n) = An×ℜn(a−n) which is not a fix set and is
8a function of the other users’ actions. Therefore, convexity of the optimization problem of each user is
not a sufficient condition for the existence of RNE, meaning that we need to utilize VI in the sequel.
Lemma 1. 1) For the uncertainty region in (11), the strategy of each user is a convex, bounded, and
closed set. 2) Ψn(an, a−n) is a concave and continuous differentiable function of an for every a−n,
where,
Ψn(an, a−n) = min
f˜n∈ℜn(a−n)
un(an, f˜n) = un(an, f˜
∗
n) (18)
and
f˜∗n = fn − εnϑn (19)
where f˜∗n = [f˜∗n, · · · , f˜K∗n ], ϑn = [ϑ1n, · · · , ϑKn ], and ϑkn is defined as
ϑkn =
∂ukn(an ,˜fn)
∂f˜kn√∑K
k=1(
∂ukn(an ,˜fn)
∂f˜kn
)2
. (20)
The robust game is G˜ = {N , (Ψ)n∈N , Â}.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Theorem 1: For any set of system parameters and strategy space of users, there always exists an RNE
for G˜.
Proof: From part 2) in Lemma 1, RNE is an instance of the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE)
(see (2) in [22]), and a˜∗ is the RNE iff it is a solution to QV I(Â, F˜), where F˜(a) = (F˜n(a))Nn=1
and F˜n(a) = −∂Ψn(an,a−n)∂an . Since Â is a convex set and Ψn(an, a−n) is a concave and continuous
differentiable function with respect to an, the necessary convexity assumptions for the existence of a
solution to QV I hold (Theorem 1 in [22]), meaning that a RNE always exists.
B. RNE’s Uniqueness Condition
Since the closed form solution to (14) cannot be obtained, the fixed-point algorithm and the contraction
mapping cannot be applied as in [7], [10] to derive the conditions for RNE’s uniqueness. To overcome
these difficulties, we show that the RNE can be considered as a perturbed NE of the NACG, and that
the condition for RNE’s uniqueness can be derived without a closed form solution to (14).
Lemma 2. F˜(a) is a perturbed bounded version of mapping F(a).
Proof: See Appendix B.
From Lemma 1, Â is a closed and convex set, and form Lemma 2, F˜(a) is a perturbed bounded
mapping F(a). Therefore, the RNE is a perturbed solution to V I(Â,F). Consequently, RNE’s uniqueness
condition can be obtained from the perturbed NE’s uniqueness condition.
9Theorem 2. When Υ is a P matrix, for any bounded value of ∆ = [ε1, · · · , εN ]: 1) G˜ has a unique
RNE; 2)The social utility at the RNE is always less than that at the NE, i.e., u˜∗ ≤ v∗; 3) The distance
between the strategy spaces at the RNE and at the NE is
‖a∗ − a˜∗‖2 ≤
‖∆‖2
csm(F)
(21)
where csm is the strong monotonicity constant for mapping F .
Proof: See Appendix C.
From Theorem 2, RACG’s performance can be examined and compared to that of the ACG through
the difference between the upper bound of users’ strategies in (21) at their equilibriums. Also, from
(21), the social utility’s reduction at the RNE (compared to NE) can be approximated. Consider W(a) =
(Wk(a))Kk=1, where Wk is a N ×N matrix whose elements are
W knm ≡

 ∂vkn(akn,fkn)∂akn if m = n
∂vkn(a
k
n,f
k
n)
∂akm
xknm if m 6= n

 , m, n ∈ N (22)
In part 4 of Appendix C, we show that the difference between social utilities at the RNE and the NE is
‖v∗ − u˜∗‖2 ≈ ‖W(a∗)‖2 ×
‖∆‖2
csm(F)
. (23)
When Υ is a P matrix, a∗n is the attractor for V I(Â, F˜) (Proposition 2.4.10 in [2]), i.e.,
lim
∆→0
‖a∗ − a˜∗‖2 = 0 ∀a
∗ ∈ A, a˜∗ ∈ Â,
meaning that when uncertainty approaches zero, the RNE converges to the NE.
C. Numerical Validation
Consider the power allocation problem (Example 1 in Table I), where the transmit power of user
n on sub-channel k is akn in (1). We have −∇2anvn(an, fn) = diag( 1(σ¯kn+∑m∈N akmh¯knm)2 )
K
k=1. In this
case, αminn = min(
1
σ¯kn+
∑
m∈N
amaxm,kh¯
k
nm
)2, and −∇amanvn(an, fn) = diag(
h¯knm
(σ¯kn+
∑
m∈N
akmh¯
k
nm)
2
)Kk=1. Therefore,
βmaxnm = maxk∈K
h¯knm
(σ¯kn+
∑
m∈N
aminm,kh¯
k
nn)
2
. For simplicity, assume that the normalized noise power in all sub-
channels for each user are the same, and aminn,k = 0. In such cases, the matrix Υ is a P matrix iff
min
k∈K
1
(σ¯kn +
∑
m∈N a
max
m,kh¯
k
nm)
2
>
∑
m6=n
max
k∈K
h¯knm
(σ¯kn)
2
∀n ∈ N , (24)
which is the uniqueness condition for the power control game. Otherwise, the power allocation problem
may have multiple Nash equilibria. As a numerical example for Theorem 1, we consider two users and
two sub-channels, and assume amaxn = amaxn,k = 1. To ensure that the monotonicity condition (24) of the
10
power allocation game holds and Υ is a P matrix, the interference channel gain between users is chosen
much less than the direct channel gain between transmitters and their receivers, i.e., h¯knm < 0.01. In our
simulation, the matrix Υ is
Υ =

 1.5432 −0.016
−0.0012 1.221


Since (24) is satisfied for the above matrix, it is a strictly monotone matrix. Figs. 1 (a) and 1 (b) show the
mappings F1(a) and F2(a) for the allocated power levels in subchannel 1 for users 1 and 2, respectively.
For n ∈ {1, 2}, the mapping Fn(a) is obtained by considering a fixed transmit power of the other user,
and as we show in Figs. 1 (a) and 1 (b), it is monotone. Fig. 2 shows the surface of the social utility of
users 1 and 2 for a1 and a2 as their strategies in sub-channel 1 and 2, respectively. We consider εn ≤ 0.8
for both users. In this case, our simulations show that: 1) Both the NE and the RNE are unique; 2) The
social utility at NE is v∗1 + v∗2 = 1.6. The social utility at the RNE is u˜∗1+ u˜∗2 = 0.585, which is less than
the social utility at the NE, as expected from part 1 in Theorem 1; and 3) At the NE, the allocated power
for users 1 and 2 are (a∗11 = 0.5, a∗21 = 0.5) and (a∗12 = 0.4, a∗22 = 0.6), respectively; and the RNEs for
users 1 and 2 are (a˜∗11 = 0.4, a˜∗21 = 0.6) and (a˜∗12 = 0.9, a˜∗22 = 0.1). In this example, the upper bound
in (21) is 1.3115, and the exact value of ‖a∗ − a˜∗‖2 is 0.7211, which is less than its upper bound (21).
Consider ‖Wk(a)‖2 =
√
(λmax(W∗k(a)Wk(a)), where W∗k(a) is the conjugate transpose of Wk(a) and
λmax is the maximum eigenvalue of the matrix. In our simulation λmax(W∗1(a)W1(a)) = 0.9091 and
λmax(W∗2(a)W2(a)) = 0.59. From (23), the distance between the social utilities at the RNE and at the
NE is 1.02, and in simulation, this difference is to 1.015. Note that all of the above results validate
Theorem 2.
V. LOGARITHMIC UTILITY FUNCTION
We now consider a special form of uncertainty region and utility function that are pertinent to Example
1 in Table I, to show that in such cases, VI becomes very simple, and the strict monotonicity requirement
is relaxed to the positive semidefiniteness of an affine mapping. Let the utility of each user be [23]
vkn(a
k
n, f
k
n) =


log(ckn +
akn
fkn
), if θ = 1
(ckn+
akn
fkn
)θ+1
θ+1 , if − 1 < θ < 0 or θ < −1
(25)
where ckn is the fixed system parameter related to each dimension of each user. Assume that for the
uncertain parameter of each user, we have x˜knm = xknm + x̂knm where x˜knm, xknm and x̂knm are the actual
11
value, the nominal value, and the error, respectively. The uncertainty region for each user is
ℜkn = {
√√√√ N∑
m=1,m6=n
(
x̂knm
xknn
)2 ≤ ǫkn}, ∀k (26)
where ǫkn is the bound on the uncertainty region for user n in sub-channel k. The above formulation
models the power control game when uncertainty emanates from variations in the channel gain between
transmitter m and receiver n.
Proposition 1. For an ACG with utility function (25): 1) The NE is the solution to an affine VI denoted
by AV I(A,M) where M(a) = (Mn(a))Nn=1, and
Mn(a) = wn +
N∑
m=1
MnmaTm (27)
where wn = (y
k
n+c
k
n
xknn
)Kk=1 and Mmn = diag(
xknm
xknn
)Kk=1. 2) Consider a N×N matrix Mmax whose elements
are
Mmaxnm =

 maxk∈K
xknm
xknn
if m 6= n
0 otherwise
The NE is unique when
max
n∈N
‖an‖2 >
∑
m6=n
Mmaxnm ‖am‖2, ∀an ∈ An, ∀n,m ∈ N . (28)
Proof: See Appendix D.
From Proposition 1, when the impact of users on each other is sufficiently low, the NE is unique.
For the example of power control game, Proposition 1 implies that when interference between users is
sufficiently low, the NE of NACG is unique [24], [25]. We now derive the RNE’ uniqueness condition
for such cases.
Theorem 3. For the utility function (25): 1) The AVI mapping of the RNE is M˜(a) = (M˜(a))Nn=1,
where
M˜n(a) =Mn(a) + M̂n(a), ∀n ∈ N , (29)
where M̂n(a−n) = (ǫkn‖ak−n‖)Kk=1 and ak−n = [ak1 , · · · , akn−1, akn+1, · · · , akN ]; 2) When (28) holds, the
RNE of G˜ is unique for any bounded ǫkn; 3) When (28) holds, the total utility of each user at the
RNE is always less than that at the NE, and the upper bound on the strategy space of each user is
‖a∗ − a˜∗‖ ≤ ‖E‖
2
2
λmin(Mmax) , where
Enm =

 ‖ǫn‖∞ if m = n0 otherwise
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where λmin is the minimum eigenvalue of matrix Mmax, ǫn = [ǫ1n, · · · , ǫKn ] and ‖.‖∞ is the maximum
element of the vector.
Proof: See Appendix E.
Remark 3. From Theorems 2 and 3, RNE’s uniqueness condition is not related to the size of the
uncertainty region. Theorems 2 and 3 show that for a closed, bounded, and convex uncertainty region,
RNE’s uniqueness condition is the same as NE’s uniqueness condition. By rearranging AVI of the RNE
for the utility function (25), the best response solution of the RACG is
a˜kn = [λ
1
θ
n −
ckn + y
k
n
xknn
−
∑
m6=n
xknma
k
m
xknn
− ǫkn‖a
k
−n‖]
amaxnk
aminnk
, (30)
which is similar to (13) in [17] for the power control game in spectrum sharing environments. From
Theorem 2 in [17], the RNE’s uniqueness condition is related to the size of the uncertainty region. But
if we use VI to analyze the RNE, its uniqueness condition is independent of the size of the uncertainty
region.
VI. DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHMS
To develop a distributed algorithm for this class of games, we use the proximal-response map â.
Consider â = [â1, · · · , âN ], where â is the solution to following optimization problem with respect to b
â(b) , max
a∈Â
[
N∑
n=1
Ψn(an,b−n)−
1
2
‖a− b‖22], (31)
where b = [b1, · · · ,bN ] belongs to Â. The above problem can be decomposed into N subproblems as
ân(b) = max
an∈An(a−n)
[Ψn(an,b−n)−
1
2
‖an − bn‖22], ,b ∈ Â(a−n), ∀n ∈ N , (32)
In this way, a distributed iterative algorithm is developed. Consider ân and bn as solutions for user n in
the current and pervious iterations, respectively. When a user is informed about the other users’ solutions
before updating its strategy, it can obtain the solution to (32). The distributed algorithm based on proximal
response map is summarized in Table II, where users update their transmit strategies at discrete instances
t denoted by T = [1, · · · , T ], an(t) denotes the transmission strategy of user n at iteration t, and fn(t)
is the observation of user n at t measured by its receiver and sent to the transmitter.
In Theorem 4 below, we obtain the conditions for convergence of the iterative algorithm.
Theorem 4. As T →∞, the distributed algorithm in Table II converges to the unique RNE from any
initial strategy an(0), if Υ is a P matrix, and ∂
3vkn(an,f
k
n)
∂2akn∂f
k
n
= ∂
3vkn(an,f
k
n)
∂akn∂
2fkn
= 0.
Proof: See Appendix F.
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Note that the condition ∂
3vkn(an,f
k
n)
∂2akn∂f
k
n
= 0 holds for the Jackson network. For the power control game,
when Υ is a P matrix, interference in the system is very low, and consequently, the signal to interference
and noise ratio of each usr is high. For this case, h¯
k
nna
k
n
fkn
>> 1, and the utility function of each user is
vn(an, fn) =
∑K
k=1 log(
h¯knna
k
n
fkn
) which also meets ∂
3vkn(an,f
k
n)
∂2akn∂f
k
n
= 0. As we see in Theorem 4, the distributed
algorithm converges to the unique NE when Υ is a P -matrix irrespective of the size of the uncertainty
region, so long as the uncertainty region is closed and convex.
Remark 4. In Lemma 1, we showed that Ψn = un(an, fn − εnϑn) is concave. Also the proximal
response map is strictly convex. Therefore, the Lagrange function can be used to derive the solution to
(32) for each user at each iteration as
Ln(an, µn) = un(an, fn − εnϑn)−
1
2
‖an(t)− an(t− 1)‖
2
2 − µn(
K∑
k=1
akn − a
max
n ), (33)
where µn is the lagrange multiplier for user n that satisfies
µn(
K∑
k=1
akn − a
max
n ) = 0, (34)
The solution to (33) with respect to akn is
∂Ln(an, µn)
∂akn
= (35)
∂ukn(a
k
n, fn − εnϑ
k
n)
∂akn
− εn
∂ukn(a
k
n, fn − εnϑ
k
n)
∂fkn
ϑkn
∂akn
− µn − (a
k
n(t)− a
k
n(t− 1)) = 0, ∀k ∈ K,
User n solves (35) to obtain an(t) in each iteration. For (25), the proximal map’s solution is
Mn(a(t)) = wn +
N∑
m=1
MnmaTm(t− 1) + In, (36)
where In = (akn(t)−akn(t−1))Kk=1. For example, the proximal map’s solution to the power control game
is
akn(t)=
1
2
[λ
1
θ
n −
ckn + y
k
n
xknn
−
∑
m6=n
xknma
k
m(t− 1)
xknn
− ǫkn‖a
k
−n(t− 1)‖+ a
k
n(t− 1)]
amaxnk
aminnk
, (37)
VII. EFFECTS OF ROBUSTNESS ON SOCIAL UTILITY FOR THE CASE OF MULTIPLS NES
So far, based on NE’s uniqueness condition, we obtained RNE’s uniqueness condition. Now we study
the characteristics of RNEs when NACG has multiple NEs. In general, doing so is not straightforward
since the VI mapping for NACG is non-monotone and non-smooth, which makes it difficult to study the
characteristics of the perturbed NEs (RNEs) [26]–[28].
To compare the case of multiple NEs with that of a single NE, consider the power control game,
when Υ is not a P matrix (e.g., h¯knm > 0.5). The mapping F is non-monotone for both users. As we
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see in Fig. 3, there are multiple local optima on the surface of the utility function that correspond to
multiple NEs for this game. In this case, at the nominal NE, the convergence points for users 1 and 2
are (a11 = 0.534, a
2
1 = 0.463) and (a12 = 0.417, a22 = 0.583), respectively, and v∗1 + v∗2 = 3.0176. When
uncertainty is εn < 0.8, the RNE converges to (a˜11 = 0.556, a˜21 = 0.444) and (a˜12 = 0.325, a˜22 = 0.675),
and u˜∗1+ u˜∗2 = 3.077. This example points out that introducing uncertainty may increase the social utility
at the RNE when the NACG has multiple NEs, which is in line with simulation results in [16], [17],
[29]. This is because RNE relates to one local optima on the surface of the utility function, which is
different from the local optima at the NE. Also, considering uncertainty results in users interfering less
with each other at the RNE compared to the NE [29].
This observation shows the benefit of implementing RACG in communication systems which may
increase the social utility as compared to that of NACG. But, obtaining the conditions under which the
social utility increases is not easy. This is because utility function of each user is a non-linear function
with respect to its uncertainty region and the other users’ uncertainty regions. So, we focus on a special
case where the strategy of each user is a decreasing function of the bound of uncertainty region. In
Proposition 2 below, we obtain the condition for increasing the social utility of the RACG as compared
to that of the NACG.
Proposition 2. When W is a semi negative definite matrix and ∇εnan < 0 for all users, the social
utility at the RNE is higher than that at the NE.
Proof: See Appendix G.
Proposition 2 implies that when the reduction in the social utility due to the decrease in user’s strategies
is less than their increase in the social utility due to the decrease in other usrs’ strategies, introducing
robustness in the game increases the social utility. Note that this is one case in which the social utility
at RNE is higher than the social utility at the corresponding NE, and there may be other cases as well.
Remark 5. When the solution of affine VI is a monotone decreasing function of εn, the AVI mapping
is a semi-negative matrix (See Appendix H). For the power control game, Proposition 2 is simplified to
max
n∈N
‖an‖2 <
∑
m6=n
Mmaxnm ‖am‖2, ∀an ∈ An, ∀n,m ∈ N . (38)
This means that when all interference channel gains are sufficiently greater than the direct channels
gains, introducing robustness increases the social utility. This is an opportunistic phenomenon in robust
games when the game encounters multiple NEs. In order to benefit from this and increase the social
utility, we propose an opportunistic distributed algorithm in Table III. Obviously, checking the conditions
of Proposition 2 in a distributive manner is not easy. In addition the social utility may increase under other
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conditions. Therefore, all users play the game G without considering the uncertainty. If αminn <
∑
m6=n β
max
m
for user n, i.e., the NACG has multiple NEs, users assume uncertainty in their observations. When their
utilities increase, they expand their uncertainty regions. Otherwise, they interrupt the algorithm. In this
way, all users make an effort to escape from their local optima in a distributed manner by playing the
robust game. To implement this algorithm, we assume that users update their transmit strategy at discrete
time slots t1 = 1, 2, · · · , T1 with duration of τ . The vectors an(t1) and fn(t1) are the transmit strategy
and the observation of each user at the end of the iteration time t1. Besides, users exchange the values
of an(t1) and u˜n at the end of each iteration.
VIII. SIMULATION RESULTS
We use simulations in the two examples in Table I to provide an insight into the performance of G˜ for
different bounds on uncertainty region as compared to that of G. In the following simulations, the value
of εn is normalized to the nominal value of fn, i.e., εn = ‖˜fn−fn‖‖fn‖ , each uncertainty region is considered
as a linear norm with order 2, i.e., an ellipsoidal region, and uncertainty for all users is assumed to be
the same, denoted by ε.
A. Power Control Game
For the power control game, we begin by studying the effect of uncertainty on its performance in both
robust and non-robust approaches in terms of utility variations at their equilibria. To do so, we consider
N = 3 users and K = 16, and the amount of uncertainty is assumed to be ε = 50% at the RNE. After
convergence to the RNE and to the NE, the system parameter varies uniformly from 50% to 150%, which
causes variations in the utility of each user at the NE and at the RNE. Variations in the social utility
are shown in Fig. 4. Note that the social utility varies considerably at the NE of the nominal game for
both values of [50%, 150%], meaning that communication is very unreliable from the user’s perspective.
In contrast, the total system utility at the RNE of the robust game is stable for both cases. Note that
although we assumed ε = 50% in the RACG, reliable transmissions is provided even at values higher
than ε = 50%, e.g., up to 150%.
Next, in Fig. 5, we compare the effect of uncertainty when Theorem 2 holds with that of the case when
it does not hold, in terms of the ratio of the social utility at the RNE and at the NE for different amounts of
uncertainty. Simulations are performed for Rayleigh fading channels for bounded and uniformly generated
errors for each cross sub-channel gain. To satisfy the NE’s uniqueness condition, the channel gains are
obtained in such a way that h¯knm < 0.01, and for multiple NEs, we set h¯knm > 0.5. The ratio of the
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social utility in Fig. 5 is obtained by averaging over 100 channel realizations. Note that when the NE
is unique, the total throughput of the system gradually decreases, but for the case of multiple NEs, no
uniformity is observed. For example, when ε = 10%, the total achieved utility is higher at the RNE as
compared to that at the NE; and when ε = 20%, the ratio falls substantially. The trend is not monotonic
for different values of uncertainty, e.g., the social utility at the RNE is higher for ε = 50% as compared
to those for ε = 40% and ε = 60%. In Fig. 6, the throughput of the users versus iteration numbers are
shown for the proximal response map when ε = 80%. Note that as shown in this figure, the convergence
time of the proximal response map is longer than that of the IWFA without any uncertainty for users.
Finally, in Fig. 7, we compare the performance of the opportunistic approach with that of the nominal
game using
η =
∑
n∈N u
OP
n − v
∗
v∗
, (39)
where uOPn is the achieved utility of user n by utilizing the opportunistic algorithm at the end of the
algorithm. The value of η is obtained by averaging over 1200 channel realizations for N = [4, 6, 8],
K = [32, 64] for different values of h¯knm. Note that for very high interference levels, i.e., when h¯knm ≫ 1,
the efficiency of the proposed opportunistic approach is considerably higher as compared to that of
moderate interference levels, i.e., when h¯knm ≥ 1. Thus, the opportunistic algorithm performs significantly
better in high interference levels when the number of sub-channels is high.
B. Jackson Networks: M/M/1
To show the effect of uncertainty on the system performance in Jackson networks, we consider a
network with N = 5 nodes and K = 3 traffic classes. Figs. 8(a) and 8(b) show the effect of uncertainty
in ψkn on the convergence of Jacobi scheme and the gradient approach for reaching the NE. In this figures,
we show the percentage of increasing the total delay in the network under perturbation as compared to
that at the NE, i.e., D = d˘−d∗
d∗
%, where d˘ is the total delay under perturbation and d∗ is the delay at
the NE. Note that when robustness is not applied, neither of the two algorithms converge to the NE, and
increasing uncertainty increases the queuing delay. Figs. 9 (a) and 9 (b) show the RNE for ε = 20% and
ε = 70%, respectively, by using the proximal response map. Note that in both cases, the RNEs converge
to the vicinity of the nominal NE as compered to Figs. 8(a) and 8 (b). For example, when ε = 70%, the
total delay increases up to 2% as compared to that at the NE, while the total delay is about 1.423% at
the RNE. Therefore, RNEs are stable, and the iterative algorithm converges very fast. Note that proximal
response map, the convergence rate increases when uncertainty region is expanded.
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Fig. 10 shows the probability of RNE’s convergence, versus the total routing probability 1− rkm0 for
different uncertainty regions. Note that by increasing uncertainty, the system converges to the RNE for
a smaller value of (1 − rkm0) as compared to that of the NE (i.e., ε = 0). For example, if ε = 40%,
only for (1 − rkm0) < 0.3, the system converges to its equilibrium, while for ε = 10%, the value of
(1 − rkm0) can be up to 0.5 for convergence to the RNE. Fig. 10 shows that the effect of uncertainty
is more profound in a network with a high probability of packet loss, causing poor performance, i.e.,
large delays in the network. Therefore, from a practical perspective, when the system encounters a high
degree of uncertainty, all nodes should reduce their probability of packet drops and increase their routing
probability.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
We studied the RNE for a wide range of problems in communication systems and networks when
users’ impact on each other can be modeled as an additive function of system parameters and users’
strategies. In this game, since the user’s observations of these impacts are uncertain, each user optimizes
its utility using worst-case robust optimization. We showed that the theory of finite-dimension VI and
its sensitivity analysis can be used to obtain the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the RNE
when there is no closed-form solution to the optimization problem of each entity. We also proposed a
distributed algorithm for reaching the RNE. In the case of multiple NEs, simulations showed that at a
RNE, the social utility may be higher than that at the NE, and we derived the conditions for observing
such a case. To benefit from this, we proposed a distributed algorithm to improve the social utility at the
RNE. Simulations confirmed our analysis for two examples, namely, the power control in interference
channels, and delay minimization in Jackson networks.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
1) fn is a linear function of other users’ strategies and system parameters. Besides, the norm function
is a convex function bounded to εn. Therefore, Ân(a−n) is a convex, bounded and close set. 2) To prove
the concavity of (18) with respect to an, consider Ψn(a1n), and Ψn(a2n) for any positive value µ ∈ [0, 1].
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We have
Ψn(µa
1
n + (1− µ)a
2
n) = min
f˜n∈Rn(a−n)
un(µa
1
n + (1− µ)a
2
n, f˜n) (40)
≥ min
f˜n∈Rn(a−n)
µun(a
1
n, f˜n) + (1− µ)un(a2n, f˜n) (41)
≥ min
f˜n∈Rn(a−n)
µun(a
1
n, f˜n) + (1− µ) min
f˜n∈Rn(a−n)
un(a
2
n, f˜n) (42)
= µΨn(a
1
n) + (1− µ)Ψn(a
2
n), (43)
Note that inequality (41) is based on concavity of un(an, f˜n) with respect to an. Therefore, Ψn(a2n) is
a concave function of an. Based on concavity of Ψn(a2n), the Lagrange dual function of (18) for the
uncertainty region is
L(an, f˜n, λn) =
K∑
k=1
ukn(a
k
n, f˜
k
n)− λn(ε
n −
K∑
k=1
(f˜kn − f
k
n)
2) (44)
where λn is the nonnegative Lagrange multiplier that satisfies (11), i.e.,
λn × (ε
2
n −
K∑
k=1
(f˜kn − f
k
n)
2) = 0 (45)
The solution to (44) for f˜kn can be obtained by the optimality condition of the optimization problem
without the constraint [30], i.e., ∂L(an,f˜n,λn)
∂f˜kn
= 0, which is equivalent to
∂ukn(a
k
n, f˜
k
n)
∂f˜kn
= −2λn × (f˜
k
n − f
k
n) ∀k ∈ K (46)
Considering (46) in (45), the uncertain parameter is f˜∗n = fn − εnϑn, where f˜
∗
n = [f˜
∗
n, · · · , f˜
K∗
n ], ϑn =
[ϑ1n, · · · , ϑ
K
n ], and ϑkn is
ϑkn =
∂ukn(an ,˜fn)
∂f˜kn√∑K
k=1(
∂ukn(an ,˜fn)
∂f˜kn
)2
(47)
Using ϑkn in the utility function un, we have
Ψn(an, a−n) = un(an, fn)|˜f∗n=fn−εnϑn , (48)
Comparing (48) with vn(an, fn) indicates that the difference between Ψn and the utility function of the
nominal game is the extra term εnϑn. From A2, εnϑn is continuous. Therefore Ψn(an, a−n) is continuous
with respect to an. The derivative of Ψn with respect to an is
∇anΨn(an, a−n) = ∇anun(an, fn − εnϑn) + (∇f˜nun(an, fn − εnϑn)× 1K)×∇an f˜n (49)
= ∇anun(an, fn − εnϑn)− εn(∇f˜nun(an, fn − εnϑn)× 1K)×∇anϑn, (50)
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Where 1K is a 1 ×K vector whose elements are equal to one. The last term in (50) contains ∂
2ukn
∂akn∂f
k
n
.
From A3, the term ∂
2ukn
∂akn∂f
k
n
exists. Therefore, Ψn(an, a−n) is differentiable with respect to an. Now, the
optimization problem of each user can be rewritten as u˜n = maxan∈An×Rn(a−n)Ψn(an, a−n). Therefore,
the game can be reformulated as {N ,Ψn, Â}.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
For the RACG, we have V I(F˜ , Â), and F˜(a) = (F˜n(a))Nn=1, where F˜n(a) is obtained by (50) for
user n. Let zˆn = {xˆn, aˆm} denote variations in the system’s of parameters and other users strategies
for user n where xˆn and aˆm are variations of xn and am, respectively. When εn = 0, we have zˆn = 0
and vice versa. From A1 and A2, the mapping F˜n is continuous and differentiable around the uncertain
parameters. We use the Taylor series of the uncertain parameter and write
F˜n(a) = [F˜n(a)]zˆn=0 + εn[∇zˆnF˜n(a)]zˆn=0 + [
∞∑
i=2
1
i!
(εn)
i(∇izˆnF˜n)]zˆn=0 (51)
For εn = zˆn = 0, (51) is equivalent to
F˜n(a) = −[∇anun(an, fn − εnϑn)− εn(∇fnun(an, fn − εnϑn)× 1K)∇znϑn](εn=0) (52)
−
εn
2
[∇2anfnun(an, fn − εnϑn)∇znfn − εn∇
2
fnfnun(an, fn − εnϑn)∇znϑn](εn=0) (53)
−
ε2n
3!
[∇3∂anfn2un(an, fn − εnϑn)(∇znfn)
2 × 1TK +∇2anfnun(an, fn − εnϑn)∇
2
znzn
fn × 1TK ](εn=0) (54)
+ o
From (13), the first term in (52) is equal to −∇anvn(an, fn). Since fn is a linear function of system
parameters, the last term in (54) is equal to zero. From (6), we have
F˜n(a) = Fn(a)−
εn
2
[∇2anfnvn(an, fn)×∇znfn]−
ε2n
3!
[∇3anfn2vn(an, fn)× (∇znfn)
2 × 1TK ] + o, (55)
From A1, all the derivatives of vn(an, fn) are bounded. Therefore, the last terms in (55) are bounded,
and F˜n(a) is the perturbed bounded version of Fn(a).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
1) Consider the bounded perturbation of mappings F(a) and F˜(a) caused by variations in system
parameters as Q = ‖F(a)− F˜(a)‖2 ∀an ∈ Â. Since the strategy space of all users in each dimension
is bounded as in (1), and the uncertainty region is bounded and convex, this region is also bounded, i.e.,
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qmax = maxa∈Amin˜fn∈ℜn(a−n) ‖F(a)− F˜(a)‖2 ≤ ∞, ∀n ∈ N . Any solution to the worst-case robust
optimization in (12) corresponds to a realization of V I(A, F˜) = V I(A,F + q), where q = q × (1TK)N1 ,
and q ∈ Q depends on (a˜n, f˜n) obtained by (16) for each user, and always q ≤ qmax. When F(a) is
continuous and strictly monotone on the closed convex set A, meaning that Υ is a P matrix, the solution
to V I(A,F + q), denoted by Φ(q), is a monotone and single-valued mapping on its domain (Exercise
2.9.17 in [2]), i.e.,
∀qi = qi × (1TK)N1 ,qj = qj × (1TK)N1 , qi, qj ∈ Q =⇒ (Φ(qi)−Φ(qj))(qi − qj) = 0, (56)
Thus, when qi 6= qj , we have Φ(qi) = Φ(qj), which is single valued on Q, i.e., a unique solution for all
q ∈ Q. This completes the proof of the uniqueness of RNE under the P property of Υ. 2) Recall that
when Υ is a P matrix, F(a) is strictly monotone, and the utility is strictly convex. Since A is convex
in RK , and F(a) : K → RK is a continuous mapping on A, the solution to V I(A,F + q) is always a
compact and convex set (Corollary 2.6.4 in [2]). Also, since a∗n is the optimum value of this convex set
for V I(A,F), i.e., q = 0, any point in this set is less than a∗n, which is a solution to V I(A,F + q).
Note that a˜∗n belongs to this set. Since Υ is a P matrix and F is strictly monotone, we have
∀ an ≤ a
∗
n =⇒ un(an, a−n) ≤ un(a
∗
n, a
∗
−n) ∀a ∈ A (57)
which is also valid for a˜∗n. As such, the utility at the RNE is less than that at the NE. 3) Since F is
strongly monotone, there is a unique solution denoted by a˜∗ = Φ∗(q), which can be considered as the
worst-case robust solution to G˜ for ‖q‖2 ≤ ‖∆‖2. Now, both a∗n and a˜
∗
n must satisfy
0 ≤ (Φ∗(q)− Φ∗(0))(F(Φ∗(0))) and 0 ≤ (Φ∗(0)− Φ∗(q))(F(Φ∗(q)) + q) (58)
where 0 = (0K)N1 and 0K is the K × 1 all zero vector. By rearranging 58, we get
(Φ∗(0)− Φ∗(q))(F(Φ∗(0))−F(Φ∗(q))) ≤ (Φ∗(0)− Φ∗(q))q (59)
Since Φ∗(q) is the co-coercive function of q (Proposition 2.3.11 in [2]), the left hand side of (59) is
always less than csm‖Φ∗(0)− Φ∗(q)‖2. Using Schwartz inequality for the right hand side, we have
‖(Φ∗(0)− Φ∗(q))q‖2 ≤ ‖Φ∗(0)− Φ∗(q)‖2‖q‖2. (60)
Since Φ∗(0) and Φ∗(q) correspond to a∗n and a˜
∗
n, respectively, (21) can be obtained. 4) Since the difference
between utility functions of each user at RNE and at NE is equal to first term of the Taylor series of
ukn(an, fn) with respect to all variations in the strategies of user n and other users, we have
ukn(a
k
n, f
k
n)− v
k
n(a
k
n, f
k
n) ≈ εn(
∂vkn(a
k
n, f
k
n)
∂akn
×
∂akn
∂εn
+
∂vkn(a
k
n, f
k
n)
∂fkn
×
∂fkn
∂εn
) ∀n ∈ N , k ∈ K, (61)
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which is equivalent to
ukn(a
k
n, f
k
n)− v
k
n(a
k
n, f
k
n) ≈ εn(
∂vkn(a
k
n, f
k
n)
∂akn
×
∂akn
∂εn
+
∂vkn(a
k
n, f
k
n)
∂fkn
×
∂fkn
∂a−n
∂a−n
∂εn
)
= εn(
∂vkn(a
k
n, f
k
n)
∂akn
×
∂akn
∂εn
+
∂vkn(a
k
n, f
k
n)
∂fkn
×
∑
m6=n
xknm
∂akm
∂εn
) (62)
When εn is sufficiently small, the derivative of the strategy of each user is approximately equal to
lim
ε→0
a˜∗kn − a
∗k
n
εn
=
∂akn
∂εn
, (63)
By expanding (62) for all users in the game, we have
‖v(a∗)− u(a˜∗)‖2 ≈ ‖W(a∗)‖2 × ‖a∗ − a˜∗‖, (64)
by replacing (21) into (64), the approximation (23) is obtained.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
1) From (25), the best-response of the NACG is
akn = [λ
1
θ
n −
ckn + y
k
n
xknn
−
∑
m6=n
xknm
xknn
akm]
amaxnk
aminnk
, (65)
where the Lagrange multiplier λn for each user is so chosen to satisfy the sum constraint
∑K
k=1 a
k
n = a
max
n .
Therefore, the best response of this problem can be written as an AVI, denoted by AV I(A,M), where
Mn is obtained from (29) [2]. 2) For this case, the game has a unique NE when M(a) is strongly
monotone or when M(a) , (Mnm(a))Nm,n=1 is positive definite (Sections 2.3 and 2.4 in [2]). By some
rearrangements, we have
M(a) = (M(k)(a))Kk=1 (66)
where [M(k)]nm = x
k
nm
xknn
. When all M(k) are positive definite matrices, M(a) is strongly monotone.
Consider Mmax in (28), and its strictly lower and upper triangle matrix as MmaxLow , and Mmaxupp , respectively.
Let b = I−MmaxLow −Mmaxupp and pn = ‖an‖2. When for any p = [p1, · · · pN ] > 0, we have
max
n∈N
pn
N∑
n=1
Bnmpm > 0, (67)
all M(k) for all k are positive definite matrices (Proposition 1 in [24]). By rearranging (67), we obtain
(28). Therefore, when (67) holds, AVI has a unique solution and consequently, the NE is unique.
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APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
1) From Lemma 1, the map of RACG is the perturbed map of NACG. Since the map of NACG is
linear for the utility function (25), the perturbed map is
M˜k(a) = wkn +
N∑
m=1
x˜knm
xknn
akm, ∀x˜
k
nm ∈ R
k
n (68)
where M˜k(a) and wkn are the kth elements of M˜(a) and wn, respectively. Now, (68) can be rewritten as
M˜k(a) = wkn +
N∑
m=1
(
x˜knm
xknn
+
x˜knm − x
k
nm
xknn
)akm ≤ w
k
n +
N∑
m=1
xknm
xknn
akm + ǫ
k
n‖a
k
−n‖, (69)
Therefore, the map at the RNE is (29). 2) Since akm is bounded in [aminmk, amaxmk ] and the uncertainty region
is bounded, the value of ǫkn‖ak−n‖2 is bounded. Therefore, for any bounded uncertainty region considered
by users in the RACG, its AVI can be rewritten as AV I = (A,M + m), where m = (mn)Nn=1 =
(wn +M̂n)
N
n=1 and ‖m‖2 <∞. Therefore, the RNE is the perturbed solution to AV I = (A,M). From
Theorem 4.3.2 in [2], when M is semicopositive, the AVI has a unique solution for any value of m.
Therefore, the robust game has a unique solution for any bound on the uncertainty region. 3) The second
part can be obtained the same as in part 2 of Theorem 1. Recall that M is strongly monotone on A
when there exist a csm, such that for all a1 = (an)n∈N , and a2 = (an)n∈N we have
(a1 − a2)(M(a1)−M(a2)) ≥ csm ‖ a
1 − a2 ‖ . (70)
When ekn = (ak1n − ak2n ), for our linear formulation we have
(a1n − a
2
n)(Mn(a
1)−Mn(a
2)) = (a1n − a
2
n)(
N∑
m=1
(Mnma1m −Mnma2m)) =
K∑
k=1
(ak1n − a
k2
n )[
N∑
m=1
Mkknm(a
k1
n − a
k2
n ) ≥
K∑
k=1
(ekn)
2 −
N∑
m=1, m6=n
|
K∑
k=1
ekm
xknm
xkmm
ekn|
≥
K∑
k=1
(ekn)
2 −
N∑
m=1, m6=n
(
K∑
k=1
ekn)
2max
k∈K
xknm
xkmm
(
K∑
k=1
(ekm)
2)2 ≥ ‖en‖2
N∑
m=1
[Mmax]nm‖em‖2.
Therefore, for all n ∈ N we have
(a1 − a2)(M(a1)−M(a2)) ≥ eMmaxe (71)
Given (1) and summing over q, since Mmax is positive semi-definite, we have
eMmaxe ≥ λmin(Mmax)‖e‖2 (72)
Therefore, the lower bound of the strong monotonicity constant in M(a) is obtained. By replacing (72)
into (21), part 3 of Theorem 3 can be obtained.
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APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
When the solution to (31) is obtained by the non-expansive or contraction mapping, the distributed
algorithm for the proximal response map converges. For any vector z ∈ Â in (31), we have
(z− â(b1))[F̂(â(b1),b1) + â(b1)− b1] ≥ 0 (73)
(z− â(b2))[F̂(â(b2),b2) + â(b2)− b2] ≥ 0 (74)
Considering z = â(b2) in (73) and ẑ = a(b1) in (74), from the above two inequalities we get
0 ≤ (â(b2)− â(b1))[F̂(â(b1),b1) + â(b1)− b1] + (â(b1)− â(b2))[F̂(â(b2),b2) + â(b2)− b2] (75)
= (â(b2)− â(b1))[F̂(â(b1),b1)− F̂(â(b2),b2)]− ‖â(b2)− â(b1)‖+ (â(b2)− â(b1))T (b1 − b2) (76)
Recall that F̂n = −∇anun(an, fn + εnϑn)− εn∇f˜nun(an, fn + εnϑn)×∇anϑn, ∇anF̂n = −∇
2
an,anun +
ε1 × ∇
3
ananfnun and ∇amF̂n = −∇
2
anamun + ε1 × ∇
3
∂an∂2fnunxnm. When
∂3vn
∂an∂2fn =
∂3vn
∂2an∂fn = 0, (76)
can be written as
(â(b2)− â(b1))[
∑
n∈N
−∇2ananun](â(b
2)− â(b1))T (77)
+ (â(b1)− â(b2))[
∑
m∈N ,m6=n
−∇2anamun](b
1 − b2)T − ‖â(b2)− â(b1)‖+ (a(b2)− a(b1))(b1 − b2)T ≥ 0
Let α˜n(a) , be the smallest eigenvalue of−∇2anun(an, fn(a−n, xn)), β˜nm(a) , ‖−∇anamun(an, fn(a−n, xn))‖
for n 6= m, and z , τ(a1(b1),b1) + (1− τ)(a2(b2),b2). From (77) we get
(1 + α˜n(z))‖â(b2)− â(b1)‖ ≤
N∑
n=1
β˜nm(z
n)‖b1−n − b2−n‖, (78)
On the other hand,
−∇2ananun = −∇ananun(an, fn − εnϑn) + εn∇f˜nun(an, fn − εnϑn)×∇anϑn. (79)
Since the utility is a convex function with respect to an, the first term in (79) is positive and ‖∇2ananun‖ ≥
‖∇2ananvn‖. Besides,
∇2anamun = ∇anamun(an, fn + εnϑn)− εn∇f˜nun(an, fn − εnϑn)×∇anϑn, (80)
which leads to ‖∇2anamun‖ ≤ ‖∇2anamvn‖. From these two inequalities, (78) can be written as
(1 + αn(z))‖â(b2)− â(b1)‖ ≤
N∑
n=1
βnm(z
n)‖b1−n − b2−n‖, (81)
For (81), when Υ is a P matrix, the proximal response map in (32) is a contraction mapping (Proposition
12.17 in [3]), and converges to a unique RNE from any initial point.
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APPENDIX G
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Variation in utility function of each user for variation in the bound of uncertainty region is
lim
ε→0
∇εun(an, f˜n) = (∇anvn(an, fn)× 1K)×∇εnan + (∇fnvn(an, fn)xnm)∇εmam
+εn ×∇
2
anfnvn(an, fn)× Xnm ×∇εnan + εnXnm∇
2
fnfnvn(an, fn)×∇εmam, (82)
where Xnm is the K ×K matrix, [Xnm]kk = (xknm)2, ε = [ε1, · · · , εN ], and ∇ is the column gradient
vector. The last two terms in (82) are always positive, because of A3 and A2. The first term in (82) is
always negative because vn(an, fn) is increasing according to an and ∇εnan < 0. The second term in (82)
is always positive because vn(an, fn) is a decreasing function of fn and ∇εnam < 0. Therefore, the social
utility increases when the negative terms of (82) are less than the positive terms. By some rearrangement
and matrix manipulation, the condition for negative semi-definiteness of W can be obtained.
APPENDIX H
NEGATIVE SEMI-DEFINITENESS CONDITION FOR AFFINE VI
1) Consider AV I(B,N +n), where B is a closed convex set, N (a) is the monotone map related to B,
a ∈ B, and n ∈ B is the vector with bounded positive values. Let Φ(n) be the solution to AV I(B,N +n).
WhenN (a) is strongly monotone, Φ(n) is monotone (Corollary 2.9.17 in [31]). When Φ(n) is a monotone
and decreasing function, we have
(Φ(n)− Φ(0))(N (Φ(0)) > 0 n ∈ B ∀n > 0 (83)
(Φ(0)− Φ(n))(N (Φ(n) + n) > 0 n ∈ B ∀n > 0 (84)
subtracting (83) from (84), we get
(Φ(0)− Φ(n))(N (Φ(n)−N (Φ(0)) + n(Φ(0)− Φ(n)) > 0 (85)
The above inequality leads to N (Φ(n)) > N (Φ(0)). Because of the affinity in AVI, (85) is
N f > 0 ∀f ∈ B (86)
where f = Φ(n)−Φ(0) is a negative vector and f ∈ B. Since B is a convex and closed region, we have
f∗N f < 0, ∀f ∈ B (87)
which is equivalent to the semi-negative matrix definition. 2) From above, when the strategy of each user
in the power control game in (36) is a decreasing function, M is a semi-negative matrix. Therefore, the
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social utility increases when the strategy of each user is reduced. Obviously, M is semi negative when
−M is semi-positive, which leads to (38).
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Fig. 2. The social utility for the power control game when Υ is a P matrix.
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Fig. 3. The social utility for the power control game when Υ is not a P matrix.
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TABLE I
EXAMPLES OF ACG
Example vkn(akn, fkn) fkn xknm ykn
1 log(1 + a
k
n
fkn
)
∑
m∈N , m6=n h¯
k
nma
k
m + σ¯
k
n h¯
k
nm σ¯
k
n
2 µkn − νknnakn − fkn
∑
m∈N , m6=n ν
k
nma
k
m ν
k
nm 0
TABLE II
DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM
Distributed Algorithm for Proximal Response Map
Inputs for Each User
T = [1, · · · , T ]: Users’ iterations, εn: Uncertainty region for user n, and 0 < ζ << 1: Interrupt criteria for all users,
Initialization For t = 0,
set a feasible strategy an(0) and a random value fn(0) for all n ∈ N ,
Iterative Algorithm
For t = 1, · · · , T and T →∞
Update the transmit strategy an(t) = maxan∈An Ψn − 12‖an(t)− an(t− 1)‖
2
2 for all users,
Each user transmits the value of an(t) to other users, and
measures the aggregate effects of other users fn(t),
If ‖an(t− 1) − an(t)‖ ≤ ζ End, otherwise t = t+ 1, continue;
TABLE III
OPPORTUNISTIC ALGORITHM FOR INCREASING SOCIAL UTILITY
First Stage: All users play G to reach the NE with utility v∗n.
Second Stage: If αminn <
∑
m6=n β
max
m , ∀n ∈ N
Initialization: Let u˜(0) =
∑N
n=1
v∗n, 0 < χ < 1, ω(0) = 0, and 0 < δ << 1
Iterative Algorithm
For t1 = 1, · · · , T1;
1) Consider uncertainty region εn = ω(t1), where ω(t1) = t1 × χfor all n;
2) an(t1) = maxan∈An Ψn − 12‖an(t1)− an(t1 − 1)‖22 for all user;
3) User n transmits with an(t1), measures fn(t1), and calculates u˜n(t− 1);
4) Users exchange their an and u˜n(t1),
5) The social utility in t1 is calculated via u˜(t1) =
∑N
n=1
u˜n(t1);
6) If u˜(t1) > u˜(t1 − 1), and ‖u˜(t1)− u˜(t1 − 1)‖ > δ: Continue; Otherwise: End.
